Procedural Right to Jury Trial in an Unincorporated Territory by Catterlin, Charles F.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 6 | Issue 2 Article 4
1-1955
Procedural Right to Jury Trial in an Unincorporated
Territory
Charles F. Catterlin
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Charles F. Catterlin, Procedural Right to Jury Trial in an Unincorporated Territory, 6 Hastings L.J. 197 (1955).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol6/iss2/4
COMMENTS
PROCEDURAL RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN AN
UNINCORPORATED TERRITORY
By CHARLES F. CATTERLiN
1. The Sixth Amendment and Jury Trials
The language of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion requiring jury trial in criminal prosecutions appears to be clear, con-
cise and complete. But it is just as clear that this constitutional provision
is not always applicable to citizens of the United States. This has been
evidenced this year in the case of Hatchett v. Government of Guam.2
Hatchett, a United States citizen, employed on the island of Guam, was
tried in the Federal District Court of Guam for three offenses, one of which
was the crime of involuntary manslaughter as defined in the Penal Code of
Guam. On conviction of that offense he was sentenced to imprisonment for
a period of one year and one day. Two lesser sentences to run concurrently
were imposed because of his conviction of the other two offenses for which
he was tried at the same time. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit of the United
States Court of Appeals, defendant Hatchett allegd, inter alia, that he was
not afforded an indictment by grand jury and trial by petit jury, as required
by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution. Speaking for the
two-man majority of that court, Judge Pope rejected defendant's claim
of violation of a constitutional right, referring to the rule in the Insular
cases.
4
The defendant was convicted of a crime without either an indictment
by grand jury or a trial by petit jury This comment is designed to answer
questions raised by this startling result and to suggest a possible solution to
the problem of reconciling the written word of the Constitution and the
judicial interpretation thereof.
It is beyond the scope of this comment to treat exhaustively the history
of the jury trial, and it is not sugested that this task is even attempted. It is
1 Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and District wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been pre-
viously ascertained by law, and to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses m his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense."
The trial by jury required by the Constitution includes all the essential elements of jury
trial which were recognized in this country and m England when the Constitution was adopted.
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
2 212 F.2d 767 (1954).
3 Public Law No. 17, 1st Leg., Sec. 62, 82; Gov't. Code of Guam, § 23115, 23405.
4 Generally- Dowdel v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1910); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901). As to jury trial: Balzac v. Porto Rico,
258 U.S. 298 (1922), Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1918); Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S 138 (1904), Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
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sufficient for our purpose to note that the jury trial dates from ancient
English history, that it was brought to this country hundreds of years ago,
that it was embodied in our earliest American political documents, that it
was embraced fully in our Constitution and that it has long been thought
to be one of our foremost fundamental guarantees of freedom.'
Why then, in the case of Hatchett v Government of Guam,6 was the
defendant deprived of the right to trial by jury in a criminal prosecution?
There are certain judicial exceptions to the provisions of the Sixth Amend-
ment. For example, these provisions apply only to Federal 'Courts.' They
do not extend to every criminal proceeding.' They do not extend to military
proceedings. They do not apply to extra-territorial courts.'0 They do not
apply to offenses against international law " And, finally, the provisions
relating to jury trial for criminal prosecutions do not apply to unincorpor-
ated territories.12
It is this last exception with which we are concerned. Hatchett was tried
in the Federal District Court of Guam. He was denied a jury trial in a
5 "To the Englishman of the fourteenth century, however, it had already become an
'ancient prerogative' to have 12 laymen stand between him and the vengeance of the king in a
cnminal prosecution of any kind, whether the charge was tippling at the inn or murder."
PALLEY, SUMMARY CONVICTIONS, quoted in Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses
and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REv. 917 ,1926).
THE COLONIAL DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (October 19, 1765), Article VII stated, "That trial
by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies."
THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (made by the First Continental Congress,
October 14, 1774) stated that the colonists were entitled "to the great and inestimable privilege
of being tried by their peers of the vicinage."
James Madison reported in "The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 which framed
the Constitution of the United States" that on August 6, 1787 there was introduced Article XI,
section 4 of the proposed constitution: "The trial of all criminal offenses (except in cases of
impeachment) shall be in the state where they shall be committed and shall be by jury." Voting
took place later and this section was amended to read, "The trial of all crimes (except in cases
of impeachment) shall be by jury, and such trial shall be held in the same State where said
crime shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, then the trial
shall be at such place or places as the Legislature shall direct." Madison notes that this amend-
ment had as its objective providing for jury trial when offenses were committed outside of any
state.
With slight grammatical change this concept is embodied in Article III, Section 2, Clause 3
of the Constitution and reiterated, as we have seen, in the Sixth Amendment.
For an historical background of the jury, see: 1 HOLDSWORTHr, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW, pp. 312-350; 1 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF CRIIINAL LAW OF ENGLAND, pp. 250-272, 1 PoL-
LOCK AND MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, pp. 136-153, LESSER, THE HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY SYSTEM; HENRY, TiE STORY OF THE CRIMINAL JURY IN LEGAL
ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO ORRIN Kip MCMURRAY, pp. 135-163, HELLER, Tin: SIXTH AMENDMENT,
c. I, II, and Coleman, Origin and Development of Trial by Jury, 6 VA. L. REv. 77 (1926).
6 See note 2 supra.
7 Coates v Lawrence, 46 Fed. Supp. 414 (1942).
8 District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1936). Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty
Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HAiV. L. REv. 917 (1926).
9De War v Hunter, 170 F.2d 296 (1942), United States v. Schultz, 67 Fed. Supp. 528
(1946).
1o Casement v. Squire, 46 Fed. Supp. 296 (1942) (United States Court for China).
11 
In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
12 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304-5 (1922).
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criminal prosecution because of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution
that the right to jury trial did not obtain in an "unincorporated territory"
of the United States. Guam is an unincorporated territory and the question
arises, what is the basis for such classification of territories? The answer to
this is that under the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, territory ac-
quired by the United States is not an integral part thereof until specifically
incorporated into the United States by an Act of Congress.3
2. Territorial Incorporation
It is necessary to point out that this comment does not purport to be an
all-inclusive study of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation itself. How-
ever, it is necessary to be familiar with this theory to see how it is being
applied today. Excellent treatises on this Doctrine may be found else-
where. 14 It should be noted here that the Constitution had early been
thought to be applicable, ex proprio vigore, to the western territories ad-
jacent to the original thirteen states.' 5 In somewhat of a contrast, it should
also be noted that the Congress has the authority to dispose of and to deal
with the territories of the United States. 6 Yet, as our nomadic ancestors
moved into the plains, mountains, deserts and valleys of pioneer America,
they carried with them not only the flag but also the Constitution. There-
fore criminal prosecution, in those territories contiguous to the States, were
required to conform to the Sixth Amendment.'7 There was no problem in
the application of the Constitutional provisions to the courts of the District
of Columbia since the United States Supreme Court decided that criminal
prosecutions in that territory must conform to the provisions of the Sixth
Amendment.' In 1867, Alaska was ceded to the United States. 9 The
United States received this territory and guaranteed to the residents there-
of, the application of the civil liberties of the United States Constiution.
1 3 DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901), White, C.J. in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901) states, "On the one hand it is affirmed that, although (territory) has been ceded by the
Treaty of Pans to the United States, the cession was accomplished by such conditions as pre-
vented (that territory) from becoming an integral part of the United States, at least until
Congress had so determined. On the other hand it is insisted that by the fact of cession alone
. . (that territory) became a part of the United States and was incorporated." "It follows
from (Delima v. Bidwell) that it is lawful for the United States to take possession of and
hold in the exercise of its sovereign power a particular territory, without incorporating it into
the United States."
1 4 WARSEN, THE S'u'ix CoURT n; UNmIED STATES HISTORY, Vol. 2 p. 707 et seq., WiL-
LouGuaY, CONSTIUTIONAL LAw, cc. 24, 25, 29 and 30; Coudert, Evolution of the Doctrine of
Territorial Incorporation, 26 CoL. L. Rxv. 823 (1926); Note, 20 HARv. L. Rav. 216 (1906),
Note, 1 CoL. L. Rav. 436-470 (1901); Note, 8 YArn LJ. 119-133 (1899).
- See note 5 supra.
16 Article IV, Sec. 3, Clause , "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful rules and regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States; . . "
1 7 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) ; Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199
(1916), Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
18 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
1915 STAT. 539, Treaty of March 30, 1867.
20o Ibid.
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The United States Supreme Court held subsequently, that for the purpose
of applying the Sixth Amendment, Alaska was deemed to be an integral
part, an "incorporated territory" of the United States, even before the
organization of its territorial government.2 '
The major problem arose at the successful conclusion of the Spanish-
American War. The United States received a far-flung empire which in-
cluded the Philippine Islands, Guam, Cuba and Puerto Rico. The Treaty
of Paris did not contain a provision for the application of the United States
Constitution to the newly won outposts over which flew the American
flag. 2' The status of such territorial acquisitions perplexed the American
people and her political parties. Such perplexity extended upward to the
United States Supreme Court.23 The stage was set for what was to be an
ingenious and far sweeping decision, the ramifications of which are felt to
this very day These followed the now famous Insular cases.' By the doc-
trine of Territorial Incorporation all United States territories were to be
classified as either incorporated or unincorporated. An incorporated terri-
tory (such as Alaska) was said to be an integral part of the United States,
while annexed or acquired territory (such as Hawaii, Philippine Islands,
Guam, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands) would retain the status of umn-
corporation until a contrary Congressional intent was somehow manifested.
Where Congress has not specifically incorporated a territory into the United
States, the constitutional right to jury trial does not obtain, as it is a proce-
dural and not a fundamental right.
3. jury Trial and Unincorporated Territories
At the same time we were acquiring possession from the Spanish, we
gained the Republic of Hawaii by annexation.' Two years following the
first of the Insular cases,26 the United States Supreme Court was faced with
the application of the Constitutional provisions of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, guaranteeing the right to indictment by grand jury and trial
by petit jury, to the yet unincorporated territory of Hawaii. ' In a 5-4 de-
cision, the Court held that there was a distinction between "fundamental"
and "procedural" constitutional rights. Among the former were freedom of
religion, speech, press and peaceable assembly But indictment by grand
jury and trial by jury in a criminal prosecution were only procedural rights.
"That the right to be indicted by a grand jury and to be tried by a petit
jury is not fundamental, that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments enforcing
this right apply only to federal courts and that a citizen of the United States
21 Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
22 30 STAT. 1754, Treaty of Paris, April 1898.
23 Coudert, Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, 25 COL. L. Rxv. 823
(1926).
24 See note 4 supra.
2530 STAT. 750, 751-annexation resolution approved July 7, 1898.
26 See note 4 supra.
27 Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
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in a criminal prosecution in a state court may be deprived of his life, liberty
or property by due process without indictment by a grand jury and without




Therefore, the Court concluded that since this territory was not yet a part
of the United States, the Constitution did not apply fully to the judicial sys-
tem of that territory of the United States. Or, putting it another, way, an
unincorporated territory was not to be deprived of its fundamental con-
stitutional rights, but indictment by grand jury and trial by jury in criminal
prosecutions were not fundamental constitutional rights and were there-
fore not secured to residents or United States citizens of an unincorporated
territory.
Justice Harlan, arch protagonist of the jury system and strict construc-
tionist of the Constitution, dissented with these words,
"It is a new doctrine, I take leave to say, in our constitutional jurispru-
dence, that the framers of the constitution did not regard those provisions
(indictment and jury trial) and the rights secured by them, as fundamental
in nature."1
29
But the following year, the Court upheld the doctrine of Territorial Incor-
poration as well as the classification of constitutional rights as procedural
and fundamental in a case arising from the City Court of Manila, P.I., in
which the Court said.
"We conclude that the power to govern territory, implied in the right to
acquire it, and given to Congress in Article IV, Section 3, to whatever other
limitations it may be subject, the extent of which must be decided as ques-
tions arise, does not require that body to enact for a ceded territory, not
made part of the United States by Congressional action, a system of laws
which shall include the right to trial by jury, and that the Constitution
does not, without legislation, of its own force, carry such right to territory
so situated."sI
Justice Harlan takes one final shot at the doctrine, now hardening into Con-
stitutional precedent, with a royal dissent.
"This court holds these provisions (Indictment and jury trial) are not
fundamental and may be disregarded in any territory acquired in the man-
ner the Philippine Islands were acquired, although as heretofore decided
by this court, they could not be disregarded in what are commonly called
the organized territories of the United States. I cannot assent to this inter-
pretation of the Court. It is, I submit, so obviously inconsistent with the
Constitution that I cannot regard judgment of the court otherwise than as
an amendment of that instrument by judicial construction when a different
mode of amendment is expressly provided for." 31
2 8 Ibid.
29 See note 24 supra.
80 Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
81Ibid.
Feb., 19551
By 1922 the doctrine was concrete and from that time no case has modi-
fied or overruled those principles. In this 1922 case it is of interest to con-
sider the dicta of Chief Justice Taft:
"The jury system needs citizens trained to the exercise of responsibilities
of jurors. In common law countries centuries of tradition have prepared a
conception of the impartial attitude jurors must assume. Congress has
thought that a people like the Filipinos or Porto Ricans, trained to a com-
plete judicial system which knows no juries, living in compact and ancient
communities, with definitely formed customs and political conceptions,
should be permitted themselves to determine how far they wish to adopt
the institutions of Anglo-Saxon origin, and when."
32
It is obvious that the Court was not thinking in terms of United States citi-
zens who lived and worked in these unincorporated territories, who them-
selves had been brought up in the continental U S. Such was the position
of Hatchett, a United States Citizen from the continental limits of the
United States. Nevertheless, he like all other residents of unincorporated
territories was deprived of the right of indictment by grand jury and trial
by petit jury as these constitutional rights were considered merely proce-
dural and inapplicable to unincorporated territories.
It is interesting to note that the case of Hatchett v. Government of
Guam38 can be distinguished from all other Insular Cases decided to date.
In Hawaii v. Manktchic4 the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were held not to
be applicable to unincorporated territories. The court there in question
was a local Hawaiian court. In Dorr v. United States5 the case arose from
the City Court of Manila. In Ocampo v. United States,"' the proceedings
were in the City Court of Manila. In Balzac v. Puerto Rico,37 the question
of jury trial was in reference to a local territorial court of Puerto Rico. The
Hatchett case appears to be the first case to present the question whether or
not Congress can create a federal court for the District of Guam, with the
full jurisdiction of District Courts of the United States, free from the re-
quirements of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment. The decision in the Hat-
chett case would appear to extend that line of reasoning which denies a
jury trial in an unincorporated teritory, from local territorial courts to the
federal District Courts. Then, there is no court available which will afford
an opportunity to be tried by jury, because such constitutional right is
merely a procedural one. The question becomes is there any procedural right
available today which would guarantee a right to jury trial in a criminal
prosecution in an unincorporated territory2
32 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
3- See note 2 supra.
34See note 4 supra.
85 See note 4 supra.
36 See note 4 supra.
37 See note 4 supra.
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4. Is Jury Trial a Procedural Right?
The Organic Act of Guam was enacted into law on August 1, 1950 and
became effective as of January 1, 1951.38 Section 3 provides: Guam is to be
an unincorporated territory of the United States. Section 5 sets forth a
Bill of Rights similar to that of the United States Constitution:
"(g): In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right to a
speedy and public trial; to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation and to have a copy thereof; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have assistance of counsel for his defense."
Section 22 provided for the judicial system of Guam, establishing the Dis-
trict Court of Guam and authorizing the establishment of territorial courts
by the law of Guam. Section 22(b) provides:
"The rules heretofore or hereafter promulgated and made effective by the
Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to section 2072 of Title 18,
in civil cases . . section 3771 and 3772 of Title 18 in criminal cases;
shall apply to the District Court of Guam and to appeals therefrom."
This section 22 (b) refers to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In the Hatcett case the de-
fendant appealed not only on the constitutional rights, discussed previ-
ously, but on the procedural rights of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure. The two Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure on which Hatchett
relied were Rule 7(a) and Rule 23(2). Rule 7(a) provides:
"An offense which may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year or at hard labor shall be prosecuted by indictment, or, if an indict-
ment is waived, it may be prosecuted by information."
Rule 23 (a) provides:
"Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant
waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent
of the government." 39
Hatchett alleged that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure in that prosecution was by information rather
than indictment and that a jury trial was not given.
The majority examined both of the grounds of appeal and announced
(1) that since one of the offenses which Hatchett was convicted of was pun-
ishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, Rule 7(a) would
require an indictment. There was no waiver in the manner specified in the
following section, 7(b). Therefore, the failure to proceed by indictment
was plain error and judgment upon the first charge, guilty of involuntary
8 48 U.S.C.A. §§ 1420-1424.
818 U.S.C. (1948).
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manslaughter, was reversed. While rejecting defendant's contention of a
constitutional right to an indictment by grand jury, the court sanctioned
the procedural right to indictment by grand jury, as set forth in the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. At this point in the decision, Hatchett was
free.
But the majority continued that Rule 23 (a), although also incorporated
into the Organic Act of Guam was not here applicable. That is to say, the
court rejected defendant's contention of a constitutional right to jury trial
under the Sixth Amendment and also rejected his contention of a proce-
dural right to jury trial, as set forth in the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure. Their position was that Rule 23 (a) is binding on the District Court
of Guam only in cases which are. (1) required by the Constitution to be
tried by jury or (2) required by a U.S. Statute to be tried by jury or (3)
required by the Guam legislature to be tried by jury The majority then
said the Insular cases had established that there is no constitutional right
to jury trial in an unincorporated territory such as Guam. Next they held
that the only United States Statute which required a jury trial in criminal
prosecutions was in the case of treason or other capital offenses,4 ° and
Hatchett was only charged with involuntary manslaughter. Lastly, they
found no Guam territorial enactment requiring jury trial of an offense
which would be tried in the District Court of Guam. Here it should be
noted that the Organic Act of Guam designated what procedure is appli-
cable to the District Court of Guam, namely, the Federal Rules of Civil
and Criminal Procedure. The territorial legislature is given no authority to
prescribe procedural rules for that federal court.4" Therefore, the third
basis used by the majority to determine that Rule 23 (a) was not applica-
ble to the Hatchett case, was erroneous.
Let us examine, for a moment, the practical result of the majority opin-
ion. The court has held that an indictment by grand jury must be had prior
to prosecution of a felony in the District Court of Guam which may im-
prison the defendant for more than one year or sentence him to hard labor.
This naturally contemplates the empanelling of a grand jury That is to
say that the grand jury will be drawn from among the 32,000 Guamanians
and 7,800 civilian workers and their families from the mainland, although
the majority appears to believe that these 40,000 citizens are unfit for petit
jury service. The majority quotes in its opinion from a governmental report,
"Since Guaminians derive their tradition in law from Spain, a civil law
nation, they have little knowledge or experience in trial by jury 42 This
sounds like a reiteration of Chief Justice Taft's view spoken more than
thirty years ago and quoted herein previously 4 It might be pointed out here
that those 32,000 Guamanians are United States citizens who, since 1900,
40 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1948).
41 48 U.S.C. § 1424(a) (1950).
42 S.R. No. 2109 of July 20, 1950.
43 See note 30 supra.
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excepting the few years of Japanese occupation, have been compelled by
law to send their children to English speaking schools until they are 12
years of age. Twenty years ago following California's Field Codes the
"Anglo-Saxon" law of California was adopted in Guam.
In a recent presidential commission report as to what laws should be
applicable to Guam it was said, "If the Congress has extended a statute to
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, the Commission considered that act
to be presumptively appropriate for application to Guam."" The commis-
sion included the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as applicable to the
District Court of Guam as well as to the District Courts of Alaska and the
Virgin Islands. Comparable District Courts in Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands have long demonstrated the feasibility of proceeding by indictment
and jury trial. The result of the majority opinion is peculiar in its practical
application of one but not all of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Chief Judge Denman concurred with the majority in holding that
Rule 7 (a) in reference to indictment by grand jury, was applicable to the
Hatchett case which was tried in the federal District Court of Guam, an
unincorporated territory But the Chief Judge dissented, vigorously, from
a holding that Rule 23 (a) was not applicable to the Hatchett case. He based
his dissent on two grounds.
"First, the Court of Appeals violated the Constitution in giving an advisory
opinion on the right to jury trial in the federal District Court of Guam, an
issue not before it. Secondly that the express provisions of 48 U.S.C.A.
1424(a), the only section on jurisdiction in the Enabling Act of Guam,
gives to its District Court the same jurisdiction as the District Courts m
the United States is limited in the prosecution of those accused of felonies,
not waiving their rights, to those indicted by grand juries and in their con-
viction to those tried by petit jurors."1
45
This comment will proceed to examine the dissent and attempt to show
how and why it is the better solution to this case and cases of a similar
nature which will arise in the future. There is a procedural right to jury
trial available today in criminal prosecutions in an unincorporated territory
by the application of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to federal
courts of that territory.
5. Federal Rules of Cri-minal Procedure in Unincorporated
Territories
It has been held that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide
a substantive method of procedure for all criminal cases in federal courts
and all prior conflicting decisions must give way 48 These rules have been
44 HousE Doc. No. 212, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., Report of the Commnson on the Application
of Federal Laws to Guam.
45 212 F.2d 767, 772 et seq. (1954).
46 United States v. Stephenson, 110 Fed. Supp. 623 (1953).
Feb., 19551 COMMVENTS
held to have the force of a statute and hence will abrogate contrary princi-
ples of common law 47 Federal courts have held these rules should be con-
strued to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, the
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and the elimination of out-
moded technicalities.4"
Many decisions have recognized the right to jury trial and the right of
waiver thereof under proper circumstances, as set out in Rule 23 (a) " A
previous case which dealt specifically with the right to jury trial under
Rule 23 (a) involved the violation of a motor carrier safety regulation as
provided for by the Interstate Commerce Commission under authority
from thew Interstate Commerce Act.50 The court there held defendant was
entitled to a jury trial. "Unless Congress expressly directs that there shall
be none, the court will conclude that Congress intended a jury trial of a
statutory offense." 51 Two other cases have dealt directly with the applica-
tion of Rule 23(a) In 1951 the District Court of Guam held that the pro-
cedural right to jury trial was not applicable since Congress did not intend
a jury trial for criminal prosecutions in the district court of Guam.2 And
in the 6th Circuit of the Court of Appeals it was said no act of Congress
required trial by jury of all offenses, therefore a District Court could trans-
act business without it. But in that case the defendant was actually given
a trial by jury and because of the lower court's error in allowing the de-
fendant to waive a unanimous verdict, contrary to Rule 31(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the judgment of conviction was re-
versed.5" Rule 23 (a) is not capable of two constructions. It states.
"Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant
waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent
of the government. '' 4
Congress clearly and without ambiguity expressed its intention that the
District Court of Guam should be bound by all the rules of procedure which
govern the District Courts in the United States in criminal cases, including
prosecution by indictment rather than by information and the right to jury
trial.' Chief Judge Denman's dissent is based on the theory that Section 22
of the Organic Act provides for the judicial system of Guam. It establishes
the District Court and authorizes the establishment of other local courts
47Ratley v. Irelan, 197 F.2d 585 (1952).
4 8 United States v. Personal Finance Co. of New York, 13 F.R.D. 306 (1952).
49 Cessano v. United States, 200 F.2d 232 (1952), George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445
(1952), United States v. Bouziden, 108 Fed. Supp. 395 (1952), United States v. Annett, 108
Fed. Supp. 400 (1952), United States v. McHugh, 103 Fed. Supp. 740 (1952), Blunden v.
United States, 169 F.2d 991 (1948), United States v. Warn, 162 F.2d 60 (947).
50 United States v. Great Eastern Lines, 89 Fed. Supp. 839 (1950).
51 Smith v. United States, 128 F.2d 990, 992 (1952).
52 United States v. Seagraves, 100 Fed. Supp. 424 (1951).
53 Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834 (1953).
54 18 U.S.C. (1948).
5 5 Organc Act of Guam, Section 22(b) (1950).
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by the laws of Guam. It confers on the District Court "in all causes arising
under the laws of the United States, the jurisdiction of a District Court of
the United States as such court is defined in Section 451 of Title 28.256
A District Court in the United States is bound also by the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. A District Court in the United States will lose its
jurisdiction if it denies to a defendant a constitutional right or a right grow-
ing out of a Statute, like the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
United States Supreme Court has said that to proceed to try an accused
for a felony without an indictment in a District Court was without the
jurisdiction of District Courts of the United States.57 That court has also
held that in a District Court a judgment of conviction not based on a ver-
dict of guilty by a jury is void.58 In maintaining that the language used
here is clear and unambiguous, we may look to the United States Supreme
Court which has held that where the language is plain and admits of no
more than one meaning, no duty of interpretation arise.59 And, where the
language is so plain as to need no construction, the court is not at liberty
to construe the language.6"
The majority, in answer to the argument of Chief Judge Denman, held
that the reference to "jurisdiction" of the District Court means only the
jurisdiction of the subject matter. That is to say, it refers only to what
cases may be tried by that court, and, since Congress has not incorporated
the territory of Guam, no constitutional right to jury trial exists which the
defendant is being deprived of. The court may have been basing that de-
cision on a distinction between legislative and constitutional courts. They
seem to treat the federal district court of Guam as a legislative court, one
created by the Congress, with limited jurisdiction rather than as a consti-
tutional court, in the sense that it was created under the judiciary article
of the Constitution. 1 In either case, however, it is vested expressly with
jurisdiction identical to that of the District Courts in the United States.
In Puerto Rico, an unincorporated territory prior to the 1948 amendment
to 48 U.S.C.A. 863 which transformed it into a Commonwealth, the Dis-
trict Court of Puerto Rico was held "to proceed in the same manner" as
I628 U.S.C.A. 451 (1948), "Definitions-As used in this title: The term 'court of the
United States' includes the Supreme Court of the United States, courts of appeal, district courts
constituted by chapter 5 of this title, including the district courts of Hawaii and Puerto
Rico . . "
5"7x parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 429 (1884), "Deciding nothing beyond what is required
by the facts of the case before us, our judgment is that a crime punishable by imprisonment for
a term of years at hard labor is an infamous crime, within the meaning of the fifth amendment;
and that the district court, in holding the petitioner to answer for such a crime, and sentencing
him to such imprisonment, without indictment by grand jury, exceeded its jurisdiction, and he
is therefore entitled to be discharged." Cf. Ex parte Bam, 121 U.S. 1 (1886).
58 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
59 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
6 0 Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935).
6 1 M ookni v. United States, 303 U.S. 201 (1937).
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District Courts of the United States in respect to requiring grand jury
indictment and jury trial.
62
There is another argument for the application of Rule 23 (a) to the Dis-
trict Court of Guam. Section 22 (b) of the Organic Act provides for but a
single procedure in crimnal cases in the District Court of Guam. Whether
the crime tried be one arising under territorial law or United States law,
the procedure is that prescribed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure. The District Court of Guam was given jurisdiction over all cases aris-
ing out of the violation of United States Statutes. This federal court was
also given jurisdiction over cases arising out of the violation of Guam stat-
utes in all cases where the Guam legislature did not transfer jurisdiction
over that particular case to a Guam court." Even though the legislature
has not provided for trial by jury of that offense, if it is tried in the Dis-
trict Court it must conform to the only procedure which governs that court,
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This doctrine has been affirmed
recently by the United States Supreme Court. Speaking of a similar situa-
tion in the Territory of Alaska, they held that the existence of a dual pro-
cedure would be undesirable and had not been intended.' The court listed
a number of earlier decisions illustrative of the practice of Congress to pro-
vide a single uniform procedure in territories where the court had similar
jurisdiction.65
What congressional intent may be inferred from incorporating the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure in the Organic Act of Guam? Without
abandoning the former position that the language of the Organic Act is
plainly intended to incorporate the Federal Rules of Crimnal Procedure,
thereby requiring jury trial as well as indictment, let us look at some con-
gressional committee reports, indicating the intent of that body H.R. 6806,
82nd Congress, 2d Session was pending legislation when the Hatchett case
was decided. Refering to this case, the United States, in a brief submitted
in support of its motion to dismiss appeal in the Hatchett case, stated,
CC The simple, and therefore most persuasive answer, is that failure to
exclude Rules 7(a) and 23 (a) from applicability in Guam constituted an
oversight on the part of both the statutory draftsmen and Congress." It
would seem that this so-called curative pending legislation is proof that
Congress did intend these Rules to have full force and effect in the District
Court of Guam.
The exclusion of indictment and jury trial in the Guam Bill of Rights
shows that Congress did not intend to make such provisions mandatory on
local territorial courts. 6 But Congress expressly provided for the applica-
62 48 U.S.C 863 (1946), prior to 1948 Amendment and see 48 U.S.C. 1,106(c) (1948), pro-
viding jury trial in criminal cases m the District Court of the Virgin Islands.
63 48 U.S.C.A. 1424 (1950).
6 4 Summers v. United States, 231 U.S. 92, 101-102 (1913).
65 Also see Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48
(1893), In re Terrill, 144 Fed. 616, 619 (1906).
6 6
ORo.mc AcT oF Gu u, Sec. 5(g) (1950).
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tion of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in the District Court. Had
Congress intended to make prosecution by indictment and trial by jury
inapplicable in the federal District Court, as well as in the courts set up
by the local legislature, it seems clear that it would have done so expressly.
In the original draft of the Organic Act no provision for a District Court
was made." The proposal then advanced was to extend the jurisdiction of
the United States District Court of Northern California to include Guam,
providing for special terms of that court to be held on Guam. Under that
arrangement Hatchett would have, without doubt, been entitled to trial by
jury. Later the bill was amended to provide a District Court in Guam. The
reasons assigned for this change are stated:
"Given a period of peace, the growth of Guam as a transportation and
commercial center for American interests in the Far East seems almost a
foregone conclusion. American business enterprise m the area will want,
and need, a center in which it can have the full protection of American laws
and legal procedure." 68
It could hardly be interpreted that "full protection of American laws and
legal procedure" fails to include the right in felony cases to prosecution by
indictment and trial by jury.
The presidential commission report as to what laws should be applica-
ble to Guam has been mentioned previously That report held that the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to the District Court of Guam.69
Therefore it is concluded that since the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure apply to the District Court of Guam, Rule 7(a) plainly requires
indictment by a grand jury in felony cases, and Rule 23 (a) plainly requires
cases to be tried by jury that would be so tried in any District Court of the
United States with jurisdiction equivalent to that of the District Court
of Guam. But even if it is contended that these two rules need interpreta-
tion, they should be held applicable in the Hatchett case for two reasons:
(a) To hold that indictment and trial by jury are not applicable in the Dis-
trict Court of Guam would be to allow a dual system of procedure to de-
velop which would be clearly contrary to decisions of the United States
Supreme Court; (b) it is evident from Congressional hearings and reports
that Congress intended these procedural rights to obtain in Guam. There-
fore, there is a procedural right available today which would guarantee the
right to jury trial in a federal District Court in even an unincorporated
territory.
6. A Review of these Rules of Criminal Procedure
The doctrine of Territorial Incorporation is law today. Fifty years ago
it was thought expedient to classify United States territories as incorpo-
67H.R. 7273, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., introduced Feb. 13, 1950.
68 S.R. 2109, July 20, 1950, Appendix 1.
69 See note 41 supra.
Feb., 1955] COMMENTS
rated or unincorporated. An incidental result was to limit the application
of some, although an unknown number, of the parts of the United States
Constitution. In reference to that constitutional, but only procedural, right
to jury trial, persons tried for criminal offense are denied a trial by petit
jurors. Therefore, 7,800 citizens from the United States living in Guam are
deprived of the right to jury trial which would exist if they were employed
in San Francisco. There are 15,000 military personnel stationed on Guam.
Should one of them run afoul of a criminal law while off duty and off a
military reservation, he is tried without a jury while in the federal courts
of the nearby territory of Hawaii, he would be tried by a jury Our long
association with the right to jury trial has lent to that institution a rever-
ence by which the everyday American citizen deems it an inherent natural
right which he retains. That this is a right subject to being judicially inter-
preted, and excepted to, was never more clear than in the Hatchett case.
That reverence to the right of jury trial is sometimes lightly regarded by
men of the law who work for a more expeditious manner of handling the
increasing number of cases and controversies. But to the average United
States citizen, it is a fundamental right. This right has been thought to be
the most certain assurance to date of the possibility of an impartial trial
of one accused of an offense.70 The doctrine of territorial incorporation did
not envision the era when half the population of the unincorporated terri-
tories was to come from the continental United States. But until that doc-
trine is overturned by the United States Supreme Court, it is law with the
result that indictment by grand jury and trial by jury are only procedural
rules.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, applying to all federal courts,
and to the unincorporated territory of Guam, should be used to carry to
that area the right to jury trial-as a procedural right, established by the
United States Supreme Court and made a part of the United States Code,
under authorization from Congress. This would be consistent with, and
harmonious to, the decisions in the Insular cases, that such right to indict-
ment and jury trial in criminal prosecutions are not fundamental, but only
procedural. The requiring of a jury trial in felony criminal prosecution in
federal courts will work no inequities or hardships if applied to the federal
District Court of Guam. There is a collateral line of reasoning in cases
dealing with these points to the effect that the people of an area like Guam
are not qualified to become jurors. Yet by the decision in the Hatchett case
there will have to be a grand jury Residents of other territories acquired
from Spain, a civil law nation, have been extended the right to jury trial.71'
If the residents of Guam, local and imported from the continental United
States, are not now ready for petit jury service, pray tell when will they be?
After another fifty years of American rule? I wonder if it follows that
because there are some individuals on Guam without sufficient education
70327 U.S. 304, 331 (1945).
71 See note 59 supra.
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or training to serve on petit juries, that all other persons are disqualified.
If this were true, would it not be logical to conclude that a jury trial should
be denied in the United States where a predominant segment of the popu-
lation is uneducated or unfamiliar with court process?
In the light of these and previously expressed considerations perhaps
it would be proper for the United States Supreme Court to review the ap-
plication of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to the unincorporated
territory of Guam, in an appropriate case. As it stands today one might
conclude that there is second class citizenship in an unincorporated ter-
ritory such as Guam. Congress has been loath to view the petitions for
Statehood from Hawaii and Alaska with favor. Congress also has enacted
"curative" legislation adversely affecting U S. citizens on Guam.7  There-
fore it is suggested that the United States Supreme Court, working under
less political pressures today, and which has recently shown its displeasure
with a lower status of citizenship7' is in a better position to interpret the
Constitution.
7248 U.S.CA. § 1424(b) (1954), c. 1017 Pimuc LAw 679.
73 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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